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COMMENT
PROGRESS IN INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT
The mental condition of one whose mind is so deranged as to require
imprisonment for his own and others good is indeed pitiable. But the
mental attitude of one who is falsely found insane and relegated to life
imprisonment is beyond conception. No greater cruelty can be com-
mitted in the name of the law.'
The past decade has witnessed a gradual awakening to the magni-
tude of the "mental illness ' 2 problem. 3 The judiciary and various state
1. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1400, at 146 (3d ed. 1940), quoted in In re Ballay, 482
F.2d 648, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2. One commentator recently has proposed eliminating the terms "mental illness"
and "mental disease" from legal tests in order to "rationalize psychiatric-legal proceed-
ings and to reduce the confusion in communications and roles among psychiatrists,
lawyers, judges, and clients." Hardisty, Mental Illness: A Legal Fiction, 48 WASH. L.
REv. 735, 736 (1973). Professor Hardisty criticizes the use of the terms "mental illness"
and "mental disease" because the terms no longer have any generally accepted medical
meaning and because they lead to "an inappropriate analogy to physical disease." Id. at
737 n. I1. Professor Hardisty states:
In fact, psychiatrists generally have concluded that such phrases as "mental illness"
are relatively useless as medical terms. Psychiatrists still employ the words "mental
illness" but do so not to describe a medical condition but rather to achieve social
purposes.
* * * People employ "mental illness" for its rhetorical power. They use it in
achieving social objectives such as suggesting dangerousness and placing the
labeled person in the same role as the physically ill.
Id. at 737-38 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). See generally T. SzAsz,
THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
This comment will avoid the use of both terms. The phrase mental abnormality has
been inserted as an alternative. In a similar vein, this comment substitutes the phrase
"involuntary commitment" for the more commonly used "civil commitment" in an at-
tempt to avoid the implications attached to the use of the label "civil." See notes 74-76
and accompanying text infra.
3. One out of every 12 individuals will be subjected to institutional care at some
time during his life. An even larger percentage will require some mental care outside
the institutional setting. Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Be-
fore the Subconn. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., Ist & 2d Sess., 1-3 (1969-70).
Analyzed somewhat differently, one in three American families is likely to be dis-
rupted by the commitment of one of its members. The absolute figures are equally
striking. In 1966 there were approximately 580,000 resident patients in public
and private mental hospitals and an additional 657,000 receiving care through
outpatient clinics. Nearly 922,000 were admitted to the inpatient clinics and nearly
630,000 to the outpatient, a substantial majority of which were involuntary. This
approximates if not exceeds the number of criminals sentenced and institutional-
ized in the United States during the same period.
Ballay, 482 F.2d at 654 (footnotes omitted).
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legislatures have evidenced increasing concern with the threat that an
involuntary commitment poses to the individual's fundamental rights.
This awakening has assumed the posture of revolutionary change
within the past year, largely due to the separate actions of three courts
and the Washington State Legislature.
The most sweeping judicial change to date came late in 1972. In
Lessard v. Schmidt' a three-judge federal district court panel held that
Wisconsin's commitment procedures violate the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause. The Lessard court recognized that: "The
power of the state to deprive a person of the fundamental liberty to go
unimpeded about his or her affairs must rest on a consideration that
society has a compelling interest in such deprivation. '5 The court thus
posited a substantive limitation on involuntary commitment: state ac-
tion is justified only where considerations of public health, welfare or
safety outweigh an individual's fundamental right to liberty. Even
within this narrow area of legitimate state action, the massive side ef-
fects which attend commitment mandate adherence to strict proce-
dural safeguards. 6 Under Lessard these procedural safeguards include:
notice of the charges and of a right to jury trial, a timely hearing, rep-
resentation by adversary counsel, the exclusion of hearsay evidence, a
right to cross examination, a right to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination and a requirement that the state prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant is both mentally abnormal and dan-
gerous. Further, the court ruled that even if all the required proce-
4. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Judge Sprecher's Le.sard opinion seems
destined to be a classic. The lengthy opinion traverses virtually the entire spectrum of
issues (with the notable exception of a right to treatment) in the involuntary commit-
ment area. The opinion's treatment of the existing case law and legal commentary is
extremely thorough. Many of the textual and footnote references found in this com-
ment are quoted and discussed in Lessard. To avoid undue repetition, source materials
which were cited or quoted in Lessard will generally not be so indicated in this com-
ment.
5. Id. at 1084.
6. Id. at 1094. The court there noted the extensive deprivations occasioned by
involuntary commitment and commented:
It is certainly true that many people, maybe most, could benefit from some sort of
treatment at different periods in their lives. However, it is not difficult to see
that the rational choice in many instances would be to forego treatment, partic-
ularly if it carries with it the stigma of incarceration in a mental institution, with
the difficulties of obtaining release, the curtailments of many rights, the interrup-
tion of job and family life, and the difficulties of attempting to obtain a job.
driver's license, etc., upon release from the hospital.
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dural safeguards were satisfied, commitment should be ordered only
after a full consideration of other alternatives.7
The Lessard court required that proof of both mental abnormality
and dangerousness be established beyond a reasonable doubt.8 A re-
cent District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decision, In re
Ballay," is in accord. The Ballay court, in considering whether the
trial court's instruction that "a preponderance of the evidence" was
the appropriate burden of proof, observed that given "the immense
individual interests involved, it is questionable whether a rather signif-
icant margin of error should be tolerated." 1o After weighing the relevant
state interests in an involuntary commitment against .the accused's
interest in liberty, and considering the inadequacy of current treat-
ment programs and the lingering societal stigma attached to commit-
ment, the Ballay court aligned itsef with Lessard, holding that "proof
of mental illness and dangerousness in involuntary civil commitment
proceedings must be beyond a reasonable doubt.""1
Neither Ballay nor Lessard considered the issue of a post-
commitment "right to treatment," constitutional or otherwise. In
Wyatt v. Stickney 12 a federal district court in Alabama recognized a
constitutional right to treatment for the first time. The court stated: 13
There can be no legal (or moral) justification for the State of Ala-
bama's failing to afford treatment-and adequate treatment from a
medical standpoint-to the several thousand patients who have been
civilly committed ... for treatment purposes. To deprive any cit-
izen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confine-
ment is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide ade-
quate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process.
7. As possible alternatives the court suggested voluntary or court ordered out-
patient treatment, day treatment in a hospital, night treatment in a hospital, placement
in the custody of a friend or relative, placement in a nursing home, referral to a com-
munity mental health clinic and home health aide services. Id. at 1096.
8. Id. at 1095. See note 119 infra, discussing In re Levias, 83 Wn. 2d 253,
P.2d -(1973).
9. 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
10. Id. at 650.
I1. Id.
12. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971) (Plaintiffs have a constitutional right to treatment). Wyatt has been con-
solidated for appeal with Burnham v. Dept. of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D.
Ga. 1972) (No constitutional right to treatment), appeal docketed, No. 72-3110.
5th Cir., October 4, 1972. For a detailed discussion of the case and the constitutional
right to treatment, see Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Commit-
ted Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1282 (1973).
13. 325 F. Supp. at 785.
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The Wyatt court went beyond acknowledgment of the existence of a
right to treatment; the court established specific standards as constitu-
tional minima,14 and retained jurisdiction to assure Alabama's compli-
ance.
Against this background of increased judicial scrutiny, the Wash-
ington State Legislature overhauled Washington's involuntary com-
mitment procedures early in 1973. The new Act,' 5 which is clearly the
most progressive state enactment to date, could serve as a paradigm
for future state legislation. Its passage provides a timely opportunity
for a detailed analysis of the recent judicial trends in the involuntary
commitment area and an evaluation of the Washington Legislature's
treatment of the various constitutional problems inherent in such
commitment. After briefly outlining the provisions of the new Wash-
ington Act, this comment discusses the general limitations, both sub-
stantive and procedural, which due process imposes on a commitment
proceeding. Finally, there is an examination of the rights and duties
which attach during the post-commitment period of detention.
1. WASHINGTON'S INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT ACT
The objectives underlying the recent Washington commitment leg-
islation were stated summarily by the Legislature: 6
1) To end inappropriate, indefinite commitment of mentally disor-
dered persons and to eliminate legal disabilities that arise from such
commitment;
2) To provide prompt evaluation and short term treatment of per-
sons with serious mental disorders;
3) To safeguard individual rights;
14. The defendants were enjoined from failing to fully and speedily implement all
of the standards, including: a right to privacy, outside communication, compensation
for labor, freedom from unnecessary restraint or medication and freedom from experi-
mentation. Further, the court set out requirements for many institutional standards
ranging from staff-patient ratio minimums to sanitation and nutrition. 344 F. Supp. at
379-86.
15. Ch. 142. [1973] Wash. Laws. 1st Ex. Sess., amending WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7 1.-
12.560. 71.12.570, 72.23.010. 72.23.070. 72.23.100. adding newsectiow. 71.05.010-.920
(Supp. 1973). The Act took effectJanuary 1. 1974. Id. § 71.05.930.
16. WAsn. REV. CODE § 71.05.010.
620
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4) To provide continuity of care for persons with serious mental
disorders;
5) To encourage the full use of all existing agencies, professional
personnel, and public funds to prevent duplication of services and
unnecessary expenditures;
6) To encourage, whenever possible, that service be provided
within the community.
Any individual may initiate the involuntary commitment process
against another by making a complaint to a designated county mental
health professional. 17 Section 20 directs the mental health professional
to evaluate thoroughly the information received and to assess the "re-
liability and credibility" of the individual submitting the complaint.' 8
The mental health professional may order initial detention of the indi-
vidual complained against for evaluation and treatment 9 upon a
finding that as a result of a mental disorder the individual is (1) dan-
gerous ("presents a likelihood of serious harm to others or himself") or
(2) "gravely disabled. '20
"Likelihood of serious harm" is defined as a "substantial risk that
physical harm will be inflicted by an individual" upon himself or
others as evidenced by attempted suicide or other physical self-harm,
injury to another or behavior which places another in "reasonable fear
of sustaining such harm."2 ' Any individual who falls within this dan-
gerousness category can be held for a 17-day period (three days of ini-
tial evaluation and treatment plus an additional 14 days if ordered at
17. A person who provides information which initiates the involuntary commit-
ment procedure and the actual applicant for detention, normally the mental health
officer, are exempted from all criminal and civil liability "where the making and filing
of such application was in good faith." Id. § 71.05.500.
18. Id.§ 71.05.150(2).
19. There is only one situation in which the mental health professional is not the
vehicle for detention. The Act allows a police officer to detain an individual and take
him to an evaluation and treatment facility if such person "is subject to lawful arrest
and as a result of mental disorder presents an imminent likelihood of serious harm to
others or himself." Id. § 71.05.150(3).
20. Id. § 71.05.150(1)(a). These categories provide the only allowable bases for
detention. The Act emphasizes this by providing that epileptics, mentally deficient, men-
tally retarded, or senile persons:
shall not be detained for evaluation and treatment or . . . committed solely by
reason of that condition unless such condition causes a person to be gravely dis-
abled or constitutes a likelihood of serious harm to others.
Id. § 71.05.040.
21. Id. § 71.05.020(3).
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a probable cause hearing).2 2 However, if the individual is dangerous
only to himself and not to others, he must be released at the end of
this 17-day period, because further detention can be ordered only if
the individual is dangerous to others.2 3
Dangerousness towards others is divided into two categories. For the
purposes of imposing an additional 90 days of detention (beyond the
initial 17-day period), dangerousness towards others can be established
by showing at a full hearing that either the individual was initially taken
into custody as a result of conduct in which he attempted to inflict or
inflicted physical harm upon another, 24 or that the individual has
evidenced such conduct after being taken into custody.25 However,
for the purposes of imposing any detention beyond this 107-day period
(17 plus 90 days), dangerousness towards other can be established
only by relying upon conduct occurring after the person is taken into
custody.21 This added period of detention cannot exceed an addi-
tional 180 days; however, 180-day periods of detention can be renewed
indefinitely provided a full hearing is held prior to each renewal.2 7
The end result of this new statutory "dangerousness" scheme is as
follows: A person who is dangerous only to himself can be held a
maximum of 17 days; a person who was initially apprehended be-
cause of dangerous conduct directed towards others but who has not
evidenced such conduct while in detention can be held a maximum of
107 days; a person who has evidenced dangerous conduct towards
others while in detention can be held for 107 days plus additional
six-month periods, provided there is a full hearing prior to each
six-month extension.
The mental health professional may also order evaluation and
treatment of "gravely disabled" persons. Gravely disabled is defined as
22. The initial evaluation and treatment period cannot exceed 72 hours. Id. §
71.05.200(I). After a probable cause hearing the maximum judicial commitment
allowable is 14 days. Id. § 71.05.230.
23. Id. § 71.05.280.
24. Id. §§ 7 1.05.280, 71.05.320(1).
25. Id. §§ 7 1.05.280, 71.05.320(1).
26. ld. § 7 1.05.320(2). This requirement poses an interesting dilemma. Treatment
may well include the use of drugs to calm the patient and deter him from dangerous
acts towards others. In order to continue detention beyond one hundred and seven
days, hospital staff may be forced to discontinue treatment at some point to allow the
violent action that can justify further detention. Query whether this would violate the
mandate that a patient receive "'adequate care and individualized treatment." hi. §
71.05.360(2).
27. Id. § 71.05.320(2).
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a condition in which the individual "as a result of a mental disorder is
in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide
for his essential human needs."'28 As in the case of individuals who are
dangerous only to themselves, detention of one who is gravely dis-
abled cannot exceed 17 days.2 9
The Act imposes a detailed set of procedural safeguards at each
stage of confinement. Initial detention for evaluation and treatment is
valid only for 72 hours, at which time the individual must either be
released or afforded a probable cause hearing,30 with a wide range of
due process protections. Sections 25 and 30 set out these procedural
rights which include, in addition to written and oral notice of the na-
ture of the hearing, the following rights: to communicate with an at-
torney immediately upon detention, to be represented by counsel at
the hearing, to remain silent, to present evidence and to cross-examine
adverse witnesses, to have the hearing governed by the rules of evi-
dence and to view and copy all petitions and reports in the court file.3 '
The Act also stipulates that the detainee may refuse all but life-saving
medication beginning 24 hours prior to any judicial proceeding.32 At
the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, the court may order
additional detention for 14 days of treatment if the individual meets
the substantive statutory criteria for detention. 33
If the treatment facility seeks a 90-day commitment beyond this
14-day period, the detainee must receive a full hearing with all
the procedural protections of the probable cause hearing. In addition
to the more limited statutory criteria for detention, 34 the detainee
28. Id. § 71.05.020(1). The serious constitutional questions raised by this category
are discussed in notes 70 & 71 and accompanying text infra.
29. See note 22 supra.
30. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 71.05.180, 71.05.200(I)(a).
3 1. Id. §§ 71.05.200, 71.05.250.
32. Id. § 71.05.210. This adheres to the stipulation in Lessard that an individual
"can have no meaningful opportunity to be heard" if incapacitated by medication. 349
F. Supp. at 1092. A recent Washington State Court of Appeals case, State v. Maryott,
6 Wn. App. 97, 492 P.2d 239 (1971), applied similar reasoning in a criminal setting.
The court held that the state could not over the defendant's objection "administer
drugs . . . at the time of trial." Id. at 97, 492 P.2d at 240. The defendant has a cog-
nizable due process right to the unfettered use of his mental, as well as physical,
faculties.
33. To be held for this initial 14-day period, the individual, as a result of mental
disorder, must be either dangerous to himself, dangerous to others, or gravely disabled.
See notes 20-29 and accompanying text supra.
34. Only dangerousness toward others is sufficient. See notes 24-26 and accompany-
ing text supra.
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must be accorded the added procedural protections of a right to jury
trial3'5 and a more stringent burden of proof to be met by the state.3 6
Additional commitment for 180 days is allowed only if the detainee is
afforded another full hearing, accompanied by the procedural safe-
guards enumerated above and an even narrower statutory criterion for
commitment. 37 Thereafter, another full judicial hearing must be ac-
corded each time the state petitions for an additional six-month com-
mitment.38
Prior to every involuntary commitment order, the court is required
to consider whether there are "less restrictive alternatives to detention
in the best interest of such person or others." 3:1 If no viable alternative
exists and commitment is ordered, the ensuing confinement gives rise
to a set of post-commitment rights. Foremost among these is the right
to "adequate and individualized treatment. ' '40 This right should assure
that the detention facility will not function in a purely custodial ca-
pacity. Further, detention in jails or correctional institutions is specifi-
cally prohibited.41
Legislative concern for privacy and human dignity during commit-
ment is evidenced by a "patient's bill of rights" which details those
privileges guaranteed the detainee within the institutional setting.42 Le-
gal competency is preserved, as is the ability to contract and to trans-
fer property. 43 All records and information are confidential, sub-
ject to release only for certain limited purposes.44
35. WASH. REV. CoDE § 71.05.300.
36. At the probable cause hearing the burden is by "'a preponderance of evidence."
Id. § 71.05.240. All subsequent hearings require proof by "'clear. cogent and convinc-
ing evidence." Id. at §§ 71.05.3 10. 71.05.320. For a discussion of the burden of proof
issue, see notes 108-19 and accompanying text infia.
37. Only dangerousness towards others, as evidenced by actions occurring while
under hospital care is sufficient. See note 26 and accompanying text .mtpra.
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.320(2).
39. Id. §§ 71.05.230. .240. .290. .320. See also note 7 supra and notes 144-49 and
accompanying text infra.
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.360(2).
41. See id. § 71.05.020(16) which defines those institutions which can qualify as an
"'evaluation and treatment facility."
42. For a listing of the specific rights retained after commitment, see text accom-
panying notes 153-57 infi'a.
43. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.05.370(8), .450.
44. Id. § 7 1.05.390. Also, § 7 1.05.440 specifically sanctions a civil damage action
for $ 1000 or treble the actual damages. whichever is greater, against any individual
who has "willfully and knowingly released confidential information or records concern-
ing him in violation of . . . this chapter .... "
624
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II. THE EMERGING DUE PROCESS DOCTRINES:
AN END TO ARBITRARY STANDARDS
The 14th amendment decrees that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
45
While due process is clearly applicable to an involuntary commitment
proceeding, 46 the absence of a definitive Supreme Court decision in
this area makes it impossible to predict exactly what substantive and
procedural standards will be applied. In a recent criminal insanity
case, the Supreme Court, reflecting on the state's power to commit the
mentally abnormal, stated: "Considering the number of persons af-
fected [by criminal insanity commitment], it is perhaps remarkable
that the substantive constitutional limitations on this power have not
been more frequently litigated." 47 The lack of substantive due process
limitations in the involuntary commitment area is equally surprising.
A. Substantive Due Process Limitations on
Involuntary Commitment
Substantive due process is a concept most courts attempt to avoid,
48
yet substantive limitations on state power undoubtedly exist. There
are protected areas in which the very existence of state regulation has
been found violative of due process: A state cannot segregate the races
in its public school system; 49 nor can it purport to affect a woman's
45. U.S. COrNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
46. As the Ballay court stressed:
There can no longer be any doubt that the nature of the interests involved when
a person sought to be involuntarily committed faces an indeterminable and, con-
sequently, potentially permanent loss of liberty and privacy accompanied by the
loss of substantial civil rights (the loss of which frequently continues even if his
liberty is restored) is "one within the contemplation of the liberty and property
language of the Fourteenth Amendment."
482 F.2d at 655, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (footnote
omitted).
47. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972) (footnotes omitted) (Indiana
statute which sanctioned prolonged, indefinite detention of a criminal defendant judged
mentally incompetent to stand trial without treatment and without invocation of civil
commitment proceedings violates due process). Ballay quoted this language and ob-
served: "Indeed, it may not be totally inaccurate to observe that the recent surge of
interest in civil commitment may occasionally focus on procedure to the ultimate detri-
ment of substance." 482 F.2d at 654 (footnotes omitted).
48. See generally P. FREUND. A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE. & E. BROWN. CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS 1321-39 (1967).
49. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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decision to terminate her pregnancy within the first three months.50
Such substantive limitations evidence a "respect for those personal
immunities which . . . are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked fundamental,' . . . or are 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.' "51 The breadth of procedural protec-
tions is of no consequence when a substantive limitation prohibits
state action; the state is explicitly prohibited from undertaking the
forbidden action.
Two substantive rationales, police power and parens patriae, tradi-
tionally have been relied upon to legitimize state action leading to
involuntary commitment. The original justification for detention of
the mentally abnormal was the state's police power.52 As with the
handling of criminal matterg, the state has a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting its citizens from persons whose mental abnormality causes vio-
lent outbursts inimical to the public welfare. But any simplistic
analogy to the state's protective function vis-d-vis criminal activity
ignores considerations which are unique to involuntary commitment.
Commitment under the police power is based on a percentage proba-
bility of future violent action. In ordinary criminal litigation, incarcer-
ation results from a finding that the defendant committed a specific
violent or antisocial act. As one commentator noted, 53 no court would
base a criminal conviction upon a medical expert's prognostication
that the defendant was eighty percent likely to commit a felonious act.
Yet the same eighty percent prediction regarding one suffering from a
severe psychosis will almost invariably lead to commitment. Absent a
specific violent act by the individual, severe questions arise as to the
viability of analogy to the criminal system and, therefore, to the va-
50. Roev. Wade. 410U.S. 113 (1973): Doe v. Bolton. 410U.S. 179(1973).
51. Rochin v. California. 342 U.S. 165. 169 (1952). quoting two opinions written
by Mr. Justice Cardozo: Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97. 105 (1934) and Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
52. See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION. TuE MENTAI_ Y DISABI-ED AND iHE
LAW 1-14 (S. Brakel & R. Rock ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN BAR FOUN-
DATION STUoY] for an historical summary of commitment in this country. During the
17th and 18th centuries facilities for the specific treatment of mentally ill persons were
unknown, primarily due to the dearth of medical knowledge. Hence, all involuntary
commitment was practiced under the state's power to protect its citizens. See ch. 3 1.
11788] N.Y. Laws, authorizing restraint and incarceration of "'furiously madd" per-
sons.
53. See Note. Civil Comnmitnent of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedure.s,. 79
HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1290 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Civil Conmnitmnent Theories]
for a discussion of the various bases for detention.
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lidity of state action under the police power rationale. The absence of
evidence of a specific dangerous act makes the inference unavoidable
that the defendant is being committed because of his "status"--men-
tally abnormal and potentially dangerous. Punishment for mere status
is constitutionally suspect.5 4
Following this trend of analysis, Lessard v. Schmidt55 required that
prediction of future dangerousness be based "upon a finding of a re-
cent overt act, attempt, or threat to do harm to oneself or another." 56
The Washington Act invokes this same substafitive limitation for any
commitment beyond 17 days, and further requires that nay such acts,
attempts or threats must have been directed toward others.57 The
Washington Act is thus in accord with the trend of recent judicial de-
cisions.
The second traditional commitment justification, the parens patriae
rationale,58 is based upon the theory that when the individual needs
care, the state is acting in his best interests by forcing hospitalization.
Formulated during the late 19th century, parens patriae has been the
single commitment theory for nonviolent, mentally disturbed persons.' :
The recent decisions recognize the validity of state action under the
parens patriae rationale in some circumstances. 60 The problem has
been to delineate the circumstances where state paternalism is accept-
54. In Robinson v. Cal.. 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Supreme Court reversed a con-
viction under a California statute which made narcotic addiction a criminal offense.
This was held to be cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th and 14th amend-
ments. See notes 74-76 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the special
problems Robinson causes in the involuntary commitment setting.
55. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See the discussion of Lessard in text
accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
56. 349 F. Supp. at 1095. See also Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1102 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (commitment under sexual psychopath law for dangerousness must be pred-
icated upon a substantial likelihood that the defendant will inflict injury upon
another).
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.280.
58. In re Josiah Oakes, 8 L. Rptr. 123 (Mass. 1845) is often cited as the prime
illustration of the advent of parens patriae commitment. Oakes was detained solely on
the basis of frequent hallucinations and an inability to conduct his business affairs.
There was no allegation that he was violent. In recognizing the validity of his deten-
tion, the Massachusetts court noted the state's right to detain those persons who fell
victim to any mental affliction. The right was grounded in "that great law of human-
ity, which makes it necessary to confine those whose going abroad would be dangerous
to themselves or others.'" Id. at 124. Since Oakes was not prone to violence, it is
obvious that dangerousness to self meant more than mere suicidal tendencies.
59. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY. sutpra note 52, at 1-14, 34-35.
60. See Ballay, 482 F.2d at 659; Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1085; Wyatt, 325 F.
Supp. at 785.
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able. Commitment has been sanctioned in instances where the indi-
vidual is either suicidal or poses an active, physical danger of
self-harm.t" Of course, detention to prevent self-harm interferes with a
person's right to embark on a course of action inimical to his own wel-
fare. The American legal system presents inconsistent answers to this
"individual volition versus restraint in one's own interest" dicho-
tomy.62 Attempted suicide is often treated as a crime, 63 yet we do
not question a person's right to court death in the name of "sport."
At this time there is no discernible judicial trend towards denying state
action to prevent a mentally abnormal individual from committing sui-
cide.134
Judicial concern increasingly has focused upon the legitimacy of
parens patriae commitment where the individual poses no immediate
physical danger to himself. Under such circumstances, commentators
have argued against commitment absent a specific finding that the
subject lacks the mental capacity to make his own decisions.65 Recent
cases have begun to accept these arguments. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Winters v. Miller36 conditioned the state's right to
commit and treat under the parens patriae doctrine upon a finding of
"legal incompetency." The District of Columbia Circuit Court of
61. For example, Lessard approved commitment for the individual's own benefit if
that individual was shown to be mentally ill and in immediate danger of perpetrating
physical self-harm. 349 F. Supp. at 1093 n.2 4 . Although the two are often lumped
together. dangerousness to self is theoretically distinct from dangerousness to others.
and should be recognized as justifying state action only within the realm of paren.
patriae, and not under the police power. Ballay, 482 F.2d at 658. See also Civil Coln-
Initm ent Theories, supra note 53. at 1293.
62. See Civil Commitnent Theories, .%apra note 53. at 1294.
63. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 32 I11. 2d 361, 205 N.E. 2d 435 ( 1965). cited in
Civil Commitnent Theories, sutpra note 53. at 1294.
64. However the new Washington Act does limit that right. Detention because of
possible self-harm, including suicidal tendencies. is limited to a maximum of 17 days.
Further detention is allowed only upon a showing of dangerousness to others. WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 71.05.280-.320.
65. See Civil Commitment Theories, supra note 53. at 1295. See alAo Comment.
InvoluntarY Civil Commitnent of the Nondangerous Mentallv Ill: Substantive Limita-
tions, 18 S.D. L. REV. 407. 416-17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Involuntary Civil
Commitment]. Note that a finding of incompentency of this nature is more serious
than the normal finding that a person is not competent to manage his property or
business affairs. An incompetency determination in this instance constitutes a transfer
of almost total decision making power from the individual to the state. Any such
transfer should be made only after a determination by a separate, impartial, and ad-
versarial proceeding. Civil Commitment Theories, sutpra note 53. at 1295
66. 446 F.2d 65(2dCir. 1971).
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Appeals in Lake v. Cameron67 recognized the issue and inquired
whether there was an "implied prerequisite [to state action] that one
who is found likely to injure himself also be found to lack capacity to
choose ... between the risks of freedom and the safety of liospitali-
zation. '' 68 The Lessard court is in apparent agreement; although in-
sisting upon a finding of actual dangerousness to self, the court sug-
gested in dicta that, as a prerequisite to commitment, the person
should also be "unable to make a decision about hospitalization be-
cause of the nature of his illness."'" 9 The "gravely disabled" category
of the new Washington Act70 appears to run contrary to the recent
decisions on this topic because there need be no specific finding of
incompetency prior to commitment.7' Should the current judicial
trend continue, the "gravely disabled" category may not survive a
constitutional challenge.
B. Procedural Due Process
Customarily, due process connotes procedural safeguards.72 In in-
voluntary commitment proceedings, procedural due process is de-
signed to afford the defendant a reasonable opportunity to contest the
state's assertion of mental disorder. Yet, traditionally the courts have
been reluctant to impose strict due process standards in this area, pri-
67. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C.Cir. 1966).
68. The court requested that the issue be discussed in the parties' supplemental
briefs. See Brief of Appellant on rehearing en bane, Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657
(D.C. Cir. 1966), quoted in Involuntary Civil Commitnent, supra note 65, at 418,
and in Civil Commitment Theories, supra note 53, at 1294.
69. 349 F. Supp. at 1094.
70. The term is defined as one who "as a result of a mental disorder is in danger
of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his essential human
needs." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(0). See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
While the "gravely disabled" category can only justify detention for the first 17
days, it must be remembered that the stigma and other deprivations attending involun-
tary commitment are not dependent upon the length of incarceration, but upon the
fact of incarceration.
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.450 states that "[c] ompetency shall not be deter-
mined or withdrawn by operation of, or under the provisions of this chapter." Further,
the statute specifically protects the patient's right to manage his property and business
affairs. Id. § 71.05.370(8). Yet the "gravely disabled" category takes an individual
who is legally "competent," able to manage his business affairs, and admittedly
not violent or physically dangerous to himself or others and robs him of the most
fundamental "competency" without requiring any specific finding regarding his inabil-
ity to choose between hospitalization and the risks of freedom.
72. "The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural
safeguards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
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marily because of a classic medical-legal conflict- the desire to help,
treat, and cure on the one hand and concern with preventing unjust
deprivations of liberty on the other. This conflict has perpetrated a
medical-legal dichotomy wherein each profession views the other with
suspicion.73 The early solution to this conflict was to label the pro-
ceeding "civil" in nature and to hold that the procedural safeguards
present in criminal proceedings do not apply.74 Recent cases have re-
jected the notion that the "civil" label controls and have placed in-
creasing emphasis on procedural due process protections, 75 reasoning
that "commitment is not simply a medical decision but also a legal
one involving the deprivation of an individual's liberty, a step not to
be taken without all the protection afforded by due process of law."'76
When the state acts under its police power in a commitment
proceeding, modern courts have found little justification for extending
less than the full scope of due process protections found in a criminal
proceeding. As in the criminal process, the state is alleging that the
individual is dangerous to the extent that he must not remain at large.
Such a decision necessarily involves a determination, under the full
panoply of due process, that "his potential for doing harm . . . is
great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty. '77 More-
over, the deprivations of involuntary commitment are at least equal to
73. For an excellent statistical study of this problem, see Kumasaka & Gupta.
Lawver. and Psychiatri.sts in the Court: Istes on Civil Comnmitment, 32 MD. L. REV.
6 (1972).
74. The origin of this civil-criminal distinction appears to be dicta in Robinson v.
California, sttprt note 54. wherein the court seemed to suggest that a "'civil- proceed-
ing with adequate medical treatment might justify relaxed due process standards. 370
U.S. at 666.
75. This emphasis stems from the Supreme Court's rejection of the argument that
a "*civil" label justified relaxed due process procedures in the juvenile delinquency area.
ln re Gault, 387 U.S. I. 50-51 (1967). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358. 365-66
(1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the appropriate burden in the juvenile
delinquency setting: "civil" label does not control). "'Thus, the relevant inquiry after
Gault is directed to the substance and not the form of the proceedings." Comment.
Application Of The Fith Amendment Privilege Against Self-lncrinination To The
Civil Conzmitmnent Proceeding, 1973 DUKE L.J. 729, 73 1. Lessard, relying on Gailt
and Winship, rejected the "'civil" label as a justification for relaxed due process proce-
dures in the involuntary commitment setting and specifically rejected the Robinson
dicta discussed in note 74 supra. 349 F. Supp. at 1088.
76. Abrams, Legislative Efforts to Re/brn Civil Comnmitment, I Nli . L.F. 12. 16
(1971), quoted in Editor's Forward, Lawyer.s and Psychiatrists in the Court, 32 MD.
L. REV. 3 (1972).
77. Humphrey v. Cady. 405 U.S. 504. 508 (1972) (sex offender's claims that he
was denied a jury trial, adequate hearing, and effective assistance of counsel at original
commitment and renewal proceedings and that he received no treatment after deten-
tion were "substantial constitutional claims").
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those attending a felony conviction. Lessard emphasized that: "In
some respects ...the civil deprivations which follow civil commit-
ment are more serious than the deprivations which accompany a crim-
inal conviction. s78 Also, as previously noted, involuntary commitment
under the police power is always based, to a certain extent, upon a
prediction of future violence.79 The uncertainty inherent in prediction
makes incarceration more tenuous than that of the criminal system.80
Finally, a felon knows upon conviction for what approximate length
of time he will be detained; a mental patient does not. This undefined,
potentially permanent loss of liberty alone would seem to justify appli-
cation of stringent procedural safeguards. 8'
Even when the state legitimately acts under the parens patriae ra-
tionale, the "paternal relationship" is not an "invitation to procedural
arbitrariness. 82 All the disabilities engendered by involuntary com-
mitment are still present-loss of liberty, indeterminate period of
detention and heavy societal stigma. "[D] ue process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation de-
mands. 83 Commitment proceedings involve fundamental interests,
which by their nature mandate reducing any margin of error to an
absolute minimum. To ensure a minimal margin of error, recent de-
cisions have compelled strict application of due process safeguards
even under the parens patriae reasoning.8 4
78. 349 F. Supp. at 1089 (emphasis added).
79. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra.
80. In Cross v. Harris, supra note 56, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals said of
police power based commitment:
It may be that in some circumstances preventive detention is in fact permissible.
If so, such detention would have to be based on a record that clearly documented
a high probability of serious harm, and circumscribed by procedural protections
as comprehensive as those afforded criminal suspects.
418 F.2d at 1102 (footnotes omitted).
81. The Ballay court stressed that the individual's interest in liberty was one of
"transcending value" and was arguably greater than the interest of a criminal or juve-
nile delinquent due to the possibility of indefinite incarceration. 482 F.2d at 668.
82. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (juvenile court waiver ofjurisdiction over 16-year-old charged with robbery and rape invalid for failure to con-
duct a "full investigation" to include a hearing and access by counsel to all relevant
records).
83. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471. 481 (1972) (parolee has due process right
to written notice and hearing prior to parole revocation), quoted in Ballay, 482 F.2d
at 655.
84. Lessard examined the history of parens patriace as a justification for relaxed
procedural protections and then stated:
Even a brief examination of the effects of civil commitment upon those adjudged
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While it is now certain that due process requires procedural safe-
guards in involuntary commitment proceedings, the exact scope of
those safeguards is undefined. Because the Supreme Court has not yet
passed on the issue, only speculation, albeit intelligent speculation
based on recent judicial pronouncements, can be offered.
C. Specific Procedural Safeguards: How Much Is Enough?
1. Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard
Notice and an opportunity to be heard are the procedural safe-
guards over which there is the least debate, for they are the most basic
in nature. 85 Under Lessard due process mandates a hearing on the
necessity of detention. 86 Washington's Act is in accord; it requires a
hearing for all periods of initial and continuing detention.87 Indeed,
the state's interest may justify prehearing detention only if the indi-
vidual poses an active physical threat to himself or to others.88 Any
prehearing detention should not exceed the time necessary to arrange
for a probable cause hearing; Washington's Act requires a probable
cause hearing within 72 hours and Lessard required a hearing within
mentally ill shows the importance of strict adherence to stringent procedural re-
quirements and the necessity for narrow, precise standards.
349 F. Supp. at 1088.
85. One court, speaking of involuntary commitment, early noted: "Notice and
opportunity to be heard lie at the foundation of all judicial procedures. They are
fundamental principles of justice which cannot be ignored." In re Wellman, 3 Kan.
App. 100, 103, 45 P. 726, 727 (1896).
86. 349 F. Supp. at 1091. The court noted that due process required a hearing
before an individual was "deprived of any significant property interest," citing Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). and then stated: "The individual's interest
in liberty is even more compelling than his interest in property rights: it follows that
no significant deprivation of liberty can be justified without a prior hearing on the ne-
cessity of the detention." 349 F. Supp. at 1091.
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.240 (the individual must receive a probable cause
hearing before 14 day detention); id. §§ 71.05.310. .320 (a full hearing before 90 day
detention); id. (a full hearing before all subsequent 180 day commitments).
88. "We think . . . that the state may . . . have a compelling interest in emer-
gency detention of persons who threaten violence to themselves or others for the pur-
pose of protecting society and the individual." Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 109 I. Washington's
statute generally stipulates the same limitation, allowing prehearing detention when the
individual presents "an imminent likelihood of serious harm" to himself or others.
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7 1.05.150(2), .150(3). But note that if a "gravely disabled" per-
son fails to respond when requested to come in for a 72 hour evaluation and treatment
period, the mental health officer can order him taken into custody. Id. § 71.05.150( I)
(d). This appears violative of Lessard's mandate requiring an active threat of violence.
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48 hours.89 Minimal procedural requirements at the probable cause
hearing include presence of the accused, representation by counsel,
and adequate notice of the reasons for detention and the individual's
rights. :0 Should probable cause for detention be found, under the
Washington Act the patient can be held only 14 days pending a full
judicial hearing with the increased procedural protections detailed
below.9' Of course, prior to any hearing due process requires that no-
tice "must be given sufficiently in advance ... so that a reasonable
opportunity to prepare will be afforded. '92 Both Lessard and the Wash-
ington Act set out the elements of adequate notice with specificity. :' 3
2. Right to Counsel
Recent judicial decisions and the Washington Act emphasize the
individual's right to legal representation. The Lessard court held that
due process required representation by adversary counsel "as soon
after proceedings are instituted as is realistically feasible. T94 Appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem was insufficient to satisfy this require-
89. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.05.150, .170, .180 (72 hours); 349 F. Supp. at 1091
(48 hours). The statutory limitations vary greatly. Ohio allows up to 60 days emer-
gency detention without further legal steps for hospitalization. More commonly five to
ten days are allowed. Several states do not specify a time limit, permitting detention
until the medical examination is completed. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY,
sutpra note 52, at 44.
90. 349 F. Supp. at 1092. WASH. REV. CODE -§ 71.05.200. Both Lessard and the
Washington Act stipulate a right to refuse all but life-saving medication within 24
hours of the hearing. See note 32 supra.
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.240. See also Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1092.
92. 349.F. Supp. at 1092, quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33. It is doubtful that
the 24 hours allowed by Michigan and Oklahoma would be adequate. MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.811 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 55 (Supp. 1972-73). In 1971
notice to the patient was required in only 26 of the 42 states that have judicial hos-
pitalization procedures. In nine states it was not necessary if notice would be "harm-
ful" to the patient's condition. Several states provide for notice to someone acting in
the patient's behalf, and the rest have no statutory provisions dealing with the subject.
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY, supra note 52, at 52 & Table 3.2.
93. 349 F. Supp. at 1091. Adequate notice includes notice of date, time and place
of hearing, notice of the basis for detention, right to jury trial, standard upon which
detention is allowed, names of adverse witnesses and the substance of their proposed
testimony. The court rejected the classical arguments that notice and hearing would be
harmful to the patient, pointing out that (1) there had been no judicial finding as to
the need for hospitalization, and (2) the societal stigma attaches no matter how short
the actual detention. Washington's provisions are equally complete. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 71.05.200.
94. 349 F. Supp. at 1099. Representation at the preliminary hearing, with adequate
preparation time, was deemed essential.
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ment. : 5 However, the court stopped short of compelling counsel's
presence at psychiatric interviews, indicating that written records of
the interviews would be sufficient.516 Similarly, in Heryford v. Parker)7
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals stressed that an individual's liberty
was at stake and placed upon the state "the inescapable duty to
vouchsafe due process, and this necessarily includes the duty to see
that a subject . . . is afforded the opportunity to the guiding hand of
legal counsel at every step of the proceedings, unless effectively
waived . ". .. ',98 Realistically, it is doubtful that there could be an
"effective waiver" of the right to counsel by one who is allegedly so
deranged as to require involuntary commitment. :1.
Washington's Act requires that whenever a person is detained he
shall be advised " [t] hat he has a right to communicate immediately
with an attorney," and this right adheres both "before and at the prob-
able cause hearing."' 1 0 Other sections of the Act provide for access to
counsel during all subsequent proceedings.' 0
95. Id. See generally Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information Service: An
Experiment In Due Process, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 405. 438 (197 1).
96. We are unable at this point, however, to be so certain that assistance of coun-
sel will prove materially beneficial at the psychiatric interview as to be able to deter-
mine that the right to effective aid of counsel outweighs the interests of the state
in meaningful consultation.
349 F. Supp. at 1100.
97. 396 F.2d 393 ( 10th Cir. 1968) (denial of due process if alleged mentally de-
ficient person is not afforded legal counsel at the hearing which resulted in commit-
ment: unclear if a guardian ad litem is sufficient or if adversary counsel is required).
98. Id. at 396.
99. One commentator has perceptively analyzed the possibility of an effective
waiver by the subject of an involuntary commitment proceeding:
Intelligent waiver by a criminal defendant is acceptable, but when the defendant is
by hypothesis a person whom the state claims to be mentally ill, the likelihood that
any waiver will be found 'intelligent' is probably so small that an inquiry into the
question would be a waste of time.
Civil Coninitmnent Theories, sttpra note 53. at 1292.
100. WASii. REV. CODE § 71.05.200. See also id. § 7 1.05.460. The statute does not
dictate expressly, as did Lessard, that a guardian ad litem cannot serve as the attorney.
However, after this comment went to print, the Washington State Supreme Court held
in In re Quesnell. 83 Wn. 2d 224, -P.2d - (1973), that an attorney can serve as both
guardian ad litem and adversary counsel. The Washington court reached this result by
redefining the role of the guardian ad litem in involuntary commitment proceedings.
specifying that the guardian ad litem must serve:
for the benefit of and to protect the rights and best interests of the alleged incom-
petent to whom he is assigned. For these purposes. it is essential that he act as an
advocate in behalf of the accused.
83 Wn. 2d at 235-36, - P.2d at (citations omitted).The court defined adequate adver-
sarial representation as including: complete investigation of the charges and their factual
bases, meaningful consultation with the client, thorough examination of all available rec-
ords and witnesses, and the active protection of the client's rights through the offering of
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3. Right to Jury Trial
Thirteen jurisdictions require jury trial in involuntary commitment
proceedings, if demanded by the patient or someone acting on his
behalf. 02 Several other states leave the issue solely to the judge's dis-
cretion.10 3 However, since a majority of the states constitutionally
provide for jury trial in both civil and criminal cases, the individual
may retain this right in involuntary commitment proceedings. 0 4 Les-
sard noted the Wisconsin statutory right to a jury trial in a commit-
ment proceeding and required that notice thereof be given to the pa-
tient. However, had Wisconsin denied a jury trial, it is possible that
the court would have found a due process violation. Lessard's rejec-
tion of the civil-criminal label seems to require this result and to clear
the way to a sixth amendment jury trial guarantee.' 05
The Washington Act provides a right to jury trial if commitment
beyond the 14 day period is sought. Care is taken to assure that the
detainee receives notice of this right. 06 A jury trial, if requested, must
all relevant legal claims and defenses. Additionally, the Quesnell court held that an
alleged incompetent has the right to: (1) be represented by a private adversary counsel
rather than a court-appointed guardian ad litem, or (2) replace the guardian ad litem
at any stage of the proceedings. It should be noted that the Qnesnell court made no
mention of the new involuntary commitment statute.
101. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.05.300, .320, .460.
102. The AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION STUDY, sutpra note 52, at 53 & Table 3.3.
cites the following jurisdictions: Alaska, California, District of Columbia, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New York (after expiration of 60 day certification procedures),
Oklahoma, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
103. Id., citing the states of Alabama, Arkansas and New Jersey.
104. Id. at 54. However, it should be emphasized that any such "right" would be
decided by each individual state, without any constitutional compulsion. It is note-
worthy that many states -have chosen not to extend the right to jury trial in juvenile
proceedings. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 548-49 (1971) (no constitu-
tional right to ajury trial in state juvenile delinquency proceeding).
105. The sixth amendment, unlike the seventh, has been applied to the states.
Duncan v. La., 391 U.S 145 (1968) (sixth amendment applied to states through the
14th); see also Sharpe v. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n, 448 P.2d 301 (Okla. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904 (1968) (seventh amendment does not apply to states under
the 14th). Note, however, that in order to justify strict procedural safeguards, Lessard
analogized involuntary commitment to a juvenile delinquency proceeding, relying on
the Supreme Court decisions in Gaudt and Winship. The right to a jury trial is not,
however, constitutionally required in the juvenile delinquency setting. McKeiver v.
Pa., 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Therefore the Lessard analogy may be of no assistance, and
a finding of a sixth amendment right probably would be based on a striit analogy to
the jury trial right in the criminal setting. This may be a difficult analogy to establish.
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.240. The person detained is notified at the probable
cause hearing that he has a right to a full hearing or jury trial for any detention be-
yond 14 days. Under id. § 71.05.300 he receives another notice after a petition for 90
day commitment is filed.
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commence within ten judicial days after notification (to the detainee)
of the request for the 90 day commitment.10 7
4. Burden of Proof
The burden of proof issue concerns the degree to which a judge or
jury must be convinced that an individual meets the statutory criteria
for commitment. Three standards exist, each of which has found favor
in a court or state legislature. Traditionally, the appropriate burden of
proof standard in involuntary commitment proceedings was "by a
preponderance of the evidence." 1118 At the other extreme, two courts
within the past year have adopted the criminal "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard.I:" Between these standards is the "clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence" burden chosen by the Washington Legislature.10
Ballay and Lessard rejected the preponderance of the evidence
standard; I both courts were concerned with the massive deprivations
of freedom flowing from a commitment order. Observing that the
Supreme Court required "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" in juve-
nile delinquency proceedings, the Lessard court stressed that parallel
interests compelled such a standard for involuntary commitment pro-
ceedings. The court concluded that the deprivations attending com-
mitment were not to be tolerated "upon no higher degree of proof
than applies in a negligence case."' 12
The telling consideration which led the Ballay court to adopt the
criminal burden was the possibility and effect of mistaken commit-
ment.' 13 The findings of a recent study add credence to the Ballay
court's concern.' 14 Eight "sane" people gained admission to 12 dif-
107. Id. § 71.05.3 10. This section purports to assure that no undue delay occurs
because of a jury trial request. The practical problems of commencing a jury trial
within this time limit could be significant.
108. See Tippett v. Md., 436 F.2d 1153. 1159 (4th Cir. 1971): In re Alexander.
372 F.2d 925. 927 (D.C. Cir. 1967): Parks v. State. 226 Md. 43, 171 A.2d 726. 728
(1961).
109. Balay, 482 F.2d at 669; Le.ssard, 349 F. Supp. at 1094-95; See also Denton
v. Commonwealth. 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964).
110. WASH. REv. CoDL § 71.05.310.
I1I. 482 F.2d at 650: 349 F. Supp. at 1094.
112. 349 F. Supp. at 1094. citing Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) ("clear, cogent. and convincing evidence" appropriate
burden in a deportation setting).
113. See notes I & 10 and accompanying text supra.
114. See Rosenhan. On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 Sci,,Nt E 250(1973).
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ferent hospitals without knowledge of the staff." 5 To gain admission
each "pseudopatient" feigned symptoms of mild schizophrenia.'
Once admitted, their task was to convince the hospital staff of their
sanity. Each pseudopatient ceased all signs of mental abnormality.
The results were staggering:' 17
Despite their public 'show' of sanity, the pseudopatients were never
detected. Admitted, except in one case, with a diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia, each was discharged with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 'in
remission' . . . the evidence is strong that, once labeled schizophrenic,
the pseudopatient was stuck with that label. If the pseudopatient was
to be discharged, he must naturally be 'in remission'; but he was not
sane, nor, in the institution's view had he ever been sane.
If the study proves representative,' 8 it indicates that wrongful com-
mitment will not be detected at the detention facility. This possibility
places increased pressure on the judicial process, as the Ballay court
recognized, to ensure against error in the judicial commitment pro-
ceeding.
Although both Lessard and Ballay required the criminal burden of
proof, the standard of "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" has
also found recent support, principally in the Washington Act.
Very recently, in In re Levias, the Washington court upheld use of the
"clear, cogent, and convincing" standard in involuntary commitment
proceedings, declaring it to be the civil equivalent of the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" criminal standard.' 19
115. Id. at 251. The hospitals were located in five different states on the East and
West Coasts.
Some were old and shabby, some were quite new. Some were research-oriented,
others not. Some had good staff-patient ratios, others were quite understaffed.
Only one was a strictly private hospital. All of the others were supported by state
or federal funds or, in one instance, by university funds.
116. Id. at 252. Name, vocation, and employment were also falsified. These were
the only alterations of personal history made.
117. Id. Length of hospitalization ranged from seven to 52 days, with an average
stay of 19 days.
118. Another experiment was arranged to reverse the process. The staff of a large
research and teaching hospital was informed that in the ensuing three months various
pseudopatients would attempt to gain admittance. The staff was asked to' evaluate
each patient on a ten point scale with a one or two evaluation reflecting the staff
member's "high confidence" that the individual was really a pseudopatient. At least one
staff member said that the patient was a fraud in over 25 % of the 193 cases evalu-
ated. Actually no pseudopatients sought to gain admission. Id. "
119. 83 Wn. 2d 253, 256, - P.2d _ - (1973). This result seems questionable
in light of Ballay. The Levias court also held that in a commitment proceeding, even
under the old statute, the state must prove both mental illness and dangerousness,
citing Lessard and WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.310. 83 Wn. 2d at 257-58, - P.2d at -
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5. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination poses par-
ticularly difficult problems when applied to the commitment process.
The contradictory considerations are: "It is essentially . . . cruel to
make a man the instrument of his own condemnation,''1 2- but if a
potential patient refuses to speak there may be no opportunity for
proper diagnosis and treatment, which is crucial, since recovery is
usually the sole criterion for early release.' 2 ' The Lessard court, citing
Supreme Court pronouncements in the juvenile setting, adopted the
view of Mr. Justice Douglas that whenever there is a "deprivation of
liberty" the privilege applies.1'2 2 The Washington Act is in accord.'
2
:1
There are distinct difficulties with the approach of Lessard and the
Washington Act. First, it is not clear that an analogy to juvenile delin-
quency proceedings is appropriate. A juvenile delinquency inquiry
determines the commission of a specific act; it does not probe the indi-
vidual's mental state. Mental examinations, on the other hand, are
directed toward a person's overall psychological make-up, and the
questions will usually be directed toward this end. Second, legitimate
action under the state's power to detain mentally abnormal persons
may give rise to a postcommitment right to treatment,1 24 and a pa-
tient's refusal to communicate would almost certainly defeat attempts
at treatment. Since holding a mental patient without treatment is con-
stitutionally suspect,' 25 detainees might be able to defeat commitment
by simply refusing to communicate with the hospital staff.
A thoughtful approach to this general problem was articulated by
Judge Sobeloff, concurring and dissenting, in Tippett v. Maryland.'
2 13
Regarding application of the privilege in a defective delinquency pro-
ceeding, the judge noted: "Because of the unusual nature of the neces-
120. Louisell. Criminatl Di.covery and Self-Incrimnination: Roger Traynor Con-
fionts the Dilemma, 53 CALIF . L. REV. 89. 95 (1965).
121. See Civil Commitment Theories, suprt note 53. at 1293.
122. 349 F. Supp. at 1101. quoting McNeil v. Director Patuxent Institution. 407
U.S. 245. 250 (1972) (Douglas. J., concurring).
123. A person detained under involuntary commitment procedures must be in-
formed - [t] hat he has the right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may
be used against him." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.200.
124. See notes 158-71 and accompanying text infra.
125. See notes 162-68 and accompanying text infra.
126. 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971) (Maryland's Defective Delinquent Act pro-
vided adequate procedural safeguards to protect constitutional rights of persons com-
mitted under its provisions).
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sary inquiries, the legitimate objectives of the legislation could be frus-
trated were the inmates permitted to refuse cooperation."'' 2 7 Judge
Sobeloff recommended immunity for any criminal acts discovered as a
result of the interviews, strictly limiting use of the results of the in-
quiries to commitment and treatment. 12 8 This recommendation may
be useful in the involuntary commitment setting, where communica-
tion is essential to a reliable analysis of the individual's condition. 2 :9
The Washington Act requires strict confidentiality. 30 The patient's
knowledge that all information obtained during examination will be
used solely for care and treatment, and that it is strictly confidential,
should effect positive reinforcement. The availability to counsel of
written results of all interviewsl3l and his participation as an adver-
sary in the commitment proceedings should adequately guard the pa-
tient's interests. Meaningful consultation could thus be assured with
only a minimal loss of procedural safeguards under the Tippett anal-
ysis.
6. Right.to be Proceeded Against by the Rules of Evidence
Lessard seemingly prohibits the admission of hearsay evidence in
an involuntary commitment proceeding. 13 2 The new Washington Act
states that the alleged mentally abnormal person has a right "[t] o be
proceeded against by the rules of evidence" at judicial proceedings. 33
27. Id. at 1162.
128. Id. at 1161-62 & n.6. The inquiry with alleged defective delinquents focuses
on past crimes and specific antisocial behavior; thus it is much closer to the inquiry
inherent in the criminal process than the involuntary commitment interview.
129. Id. at 1162, citing United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968).
Though Albright dealt with a criminal insanity defense, Judge Sobeloff noted that the
opinion spotlighted the fact that the individual's cooperation is imperative in obtaining
a reliable diagnosis.
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.390. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
131. Lessard required that written transcripts of psychiatric interviews be provided
to counsel. 349 F. Supp. at I 100.
132. Id. at 1102-03. The court relied solely on footnote language in In re Gault,
sttpra, as indicative that the Supreme Court disapproved of hearsay in a juvenile de-
linquency proceeding. However the Gault Court specifically stated that it reached no
opinion regarding hearsay and other issues considered by the lower court. 387 U.S. at
II. Further. Lessard held that counsel must have access to all reports "which will be
introduced at the hearing on commitment." 349 F. Supp. 1099-100. This implies that
at least this form of hearsay was viewed as admissible by the court.
133. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.05.250, .3 10. This right applies at both the probable
cause hearing (prior to the initial 14 day detention) and at the full hearing (prior to
a 90 or 180 day detention).
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While this statutory language could be construed as an implied bar of
hearsay, the legislative intent is not clear. 34 Three distinct lines of
analysis do, however, support the admission of hearsay evidence in
the commitment proceeding. First, Lessard recognized that: "To the
extent that exceptions to the hearsay rule permit the admission of
hearsay into evidence [at other proceedings] the same evidence may
be admitted in a civil commitment hearing."1 35 Second, the classical
statement of the hearsay rule bars only evidence that is "offered...
to show the truth of the matters asserted therein ..... :(; Utterances
by an alleged mentally abnormal person usually are not offered "to
show the truth of the matters asserted therein."' 37 Finally, even in the
criminal setting, hearsay testimony is allowed at the "dispositional" or
sentencing stage of the proceedings.' 8 Thus, psychiatric reports, so-
cial workers' studies and other relevant material probably should be
admissible during court consideration of the actual need for treat-
ment, possible alternatives to commitment, and other "dispositional"
aspects of the proceeding.
Ill. POST COMMITMENT RIGHTS:
SIGNIFICANT REFORM
Historically, the only right retained after commitment was the
"right to be forgotten."'13: Commitment adumbrated the end of mean-
ingful existence. The value of substantive limitations and procedural
safeguards is lost if the state is free to conduct a purely custodial de-
134. The language could equally be intended to inteiject an element of formality
into what are traditionally informal proceedings. This question may be answered by
the Washington State Supreme Court. which is required by WASH. RE v. Coot §
71.05.570 to "adopt such rules as it shall deem necessary with respect to the court
procedures and proceedings provided for by this chapter."
135. 349 F. Supp. at 1103. Possible relevant exceptions would include business
records, admissions of a party or hearsay admitted without objection.
136. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 584 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
137. Thus. traditionally a statement showing "insanity" has been admissible as
nonhearsay. See id., at 592-93. See also R. N' .ISFUNnOLDER. 5 WASHINGTON PRACItK E
389 (1965).
138. See Williams v. N. Y.. 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (judge's consideration of out of
court evidence, including probation reports. background. and other information in
imposing the death sentence held not violative of due process).
139. HIeIearings on the Constitittiotl Right.% oJ'the Menially ill BefIore the Stbcomm.
on Constittional Rights of the Senate Comnm. on he Jiidiciary, 91st Cong.. Ist & 2d
Sess.. at 3 (1969-70).
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tention system designed only to expedite society's indifference toward
this substantial minority.' 40 The scope of modern concern has gone
beyond identifying the proper subjects for state action; it has at-
tempted to insure continued state effort directed toward fadilitating
recovery by focusing on three specific areas of reform. First, even
when the state acts within the area of its substantive interest and com-
plies with procedural guidelines, commitment should be considered
only as a last resort. This "consideration of alternatives" requirement
is being imposed with increasing frequency. 141 Second, within the in-
stitutional setting, those alternatives which least restrict individual lib-
erty and self-respect should be chosen. A conscious effort should be
made to assure that the patient retains a definite sense of "identity."'' 42
Third, the Supreme Court has recently stated that: "At the very least,
due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed."' 143 An obvious purpose of involuntary commitment is to
return the patient to society. Procedures during detention thus should
bear "some reasonable relation" to this end.
A. The Required Consideration of Alternatives
[E] ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substan-
tial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fun-
damental personal liberty when the end can be more narrowly
achieved . by less drastic means for achieving the same basic pur-
pose. 44
140. See note 3 supra.
141. See notes 144-49 and accompanying text infra.
142. There is good reason for concern, for, as one commentator has noted:
In response to his stigmatization and to the sensed deprivation that occurs when
he enters the hospital, the inmate frequently develops some alienation from civil
society . . . . This alienation can develop regardless of the type of disorder for
which the patient was committed, constituting a side effect of hospitalization that
frequently has more significance for the patient and his personal circle than do
his original difficulties.
E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS, 355-56 (1962). For an excellent description of mental hospi-
tals, jails and other "total" institutions, see Goffman, Characteristics of Total Institu-
tions, in Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. Symposium on Preventative and
Social Psychiatry, at 43, 1957.
143. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 737.
144. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960), quoted by Lessard, 349 F.
Supp. at 1095. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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In Lake v. Cameron, 45 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals first applied this logic to involuntary commitment, holding
that the state must bear the burden of exploring the alternatives.14 6
Lessard expanded upon this idea and formulated a three-pronged re-
quirement, stipulating that the committing authority bear the burden
of proving: (1) what alternatives were available, (2) what alternatives
were investigated and (3) why the investigated alternatives were not
deemed suitable. 147
Consistent with this judicial trend and its stated purpose to en-
courage services and treatment within the community, the Washington
Act requires consideration of alternatives to commitment as a prereq-
uisite to any detention. The petition seeking detention must state
facts supportive of the conclusion that "there are no less restrictive
alternatives to detention in the best interests of such person or
others."' 48 Should an alternative course of treatment be found feasible
and instituted, it cannot exceed the time limitation for detention im-
posed by the relevant commitment section. ' 4"1 These requirements place
increased emphasis upon individual liberty and promote understanding
of an historically taboo subject.
B. Retention of Rights After Commitment
Underlying the Lessard court's decision was a concern with the
nearly total deprivation of civil rights flowing from commitment under
the Wisconsin statute. These deprivations included a rebuttable pres-
umption of incompetency, a restriction of contractual rights and the
capacity to sue or be sued, professional licensing restrictions, and
denial of the right to vote, to serve on a jury or to drive a car.'50
Washington has insured against such deprivations by detailing the
preservation of civil and personal rights after commitment. Section 41
of the Act announces a broad general policy that the committed
person shall retain "all rights not denied him under this chapter and
145. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
146. Id. at 661. The court noted that the state, and not the patient. possessed the
resources and expertise to determine the alternatives available.
147. 349 F. Supp. at 1096.
148. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.05.230(4). .240..290, .320.
149. Id.§§ 71.05.230 .320 .340.
150. 349 F. Supp. at 1088-89.
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which follow [sic] from such denial by necessary implication."'' '
Specific rights are delineated, limited only as they present an "immi-
nent" danger to the patient or others.' 52 The Act preserves rights of
privacy and individuality normally lacking in an institutional setting:
wearing one's own clothes, keeping certain amounts of money for
general expenses, storage space for private use and phone and letter
writing facilities and privileges.' 5 3 While ordinarily not thought of as
basic civil rights, these attempts to maintain individuality seem con-
sistent with an increased respect for the liberty of committed persons
and with a truly therapy-oriented program. Further, the Act preserves
contractual rights 54 and the ability to dispose of property.15. Shock
treatment and nonemergency surgery can be performed only under a
court's auspices, absent consent of the patient.' 5" There is an absolute
right to refuse lobotomy.' 57
C. A Constitutional Right to Treatment
An examination of recent cases reveals a progression toward recog-
nition of a constitutional right to treatment. In Rouse v. Cameron,'5 8
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that an
acquital by reason of insanity, which then required mandatory com-
151. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.360 (1). The quoted passage contains an apparent
error. It is suggested that the language should read that the patient retains "'all rights
not denied him . . . and which do not follow from such denial by necessary implica-
tion." Without the do not insertion, the passage would postulate a patent absurdity;
the patient would retain those rights that logically flow from those that have been
specifically denied. In any case, the phrase is diluted from its original form which pro-
vided for retention of all rights that were not specifically denied. It is difficult to envi-
sion what rights might be denied by necessary implication other than the obvious
denial of complete individual liberty. Section I I retains the original language, leading
to internal inconsistency unless corrected.
152. Id.§ 71.05.370.
153. Id.
154. Id. § 71.05.370(8).
155. Id.
156. Id. § 71.05.370(7). Apparently the patient is presumed to retain competency
to give or refuse consent in the same way he is presumed competent to contract and
dispose of property. The validity of this assumption is open to question. See note 99
sutpra discussing the problems inherent in an attempted waiver of the right to counsel
in an involuntary commitment proceeding.
157. Id. § 71.05.370(9). This guarantee reflects the concept that no matter how
compelling the state's interest or how severe the apparent need of the individual, there
are certain acts which cannot be perpetrated upon the patient's person absent his
approval. It is an absolute right. However, the problem of a mentally abnormal indi-
vidual's capacity to consent after commitment remains. See note 156 supra.
158. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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mitment, carried a right to treatment. The court based its holding
upon a statutory right and thus avoided what it deemed "serious con-
stitutional questions."' ' : While the question of a constitutional right
to treatment was not before the Lessard court, it left the strong im-
pression that, absent meaningful treatment during detention, due
process would be violated regardless of the procedural protections
afforded during the commitment proceedings."' 0 Additionally, the
United States Supreme Court has indicated a pro-treatment orienta-
tion in a variety of recent criminal insanity cases. "'3
In 1971, Wyatt v. Stickney recognized a due process right to ade-
quate treatment which attaches to an involuntary commitment.'" 2 The
court specifically held that confinement pursuant to the parens patriae
rationale violated due process absent adequate treatment,'" 3 a holding
that was later reinforced by the Ballay court. 164 To enforce the right,
the Wyatt court specified standards of treatment covering subjects
ranging from the patient's right to privacy to detailed doctor-patient
ratios, and ordered development of individual treatment programs
subject to periodic review by a permanent committee. Lack of finan-
cial resources could not be used to avoid compliance. 1135
A more difficult issue involves a right to treatment flowing from
commitment under an exercise of the state's police power, because the
rationale of the police power is to protect society, not necessarily to
159. Id. at 455.
160. 349 F. Supp. at 1086. quoting Note. Tle Na.'cent Right to Tre'atment, 53
VA. L. REV. 1134. 1140 (1967):
Accepting that due process does not forbid involuntary detention for the purpose
of rendering care and treatment under the parens patriae role, it is still clear that
such detention does not meet due process requirements if. in actual practice. treat-
ment beneficial to the patient is not rendered.
See also Comment. On the Jtstifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv.
75, 94 (1968).
161. See Jackson v. Indiana. .sprt note 47: Humphrey v. Cady. supra note 77:
Murel v. City of Baltimore Criminal Courts. 407 U.S. 355. 358 (1972) (defective
delinquent's commitment should be reviewed on basis of "criteria, procedures. and
treatment afforded").
162. 325 F. Supp 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). discussed in note 12 supra. Conlra, Burn-
ham v. Dep't of Pub. Health. 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972) and N. Y. Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). holding there is
no constitutional right to treatment.
163. 325 F. Supp. at 785. See note 13 and accompanying text .%pra.
164. The Ballay court stated: "Without some form of treatment the state justifica-
tion for acting as parens patriae becomes a nullity." 482 F.2d at 659 (citations
omitted).
165. 344 F. Supp. at 377.
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benefit the individual. However, the Wyatt court implied that treat-
ment was constitutionally mandated in this situation also: "Adequate
and effective treatment is constitutionally required because, absent
treatment, the hospital is transformed 'into a penitentiary where one
could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense.' (36 This concern
is identical with that voiced by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. In-
diana.167 When the state commits under the police power, withholding
treatment will mean that the patient has little chance of recovery.
Since recovery is the main criterion for obtaining release, lack of
treatment could lead to indefinite detention for no convicted offense.
Alternatively, even if the state exercises its police power pursuant to a
finding that the defendant committed a specific violent act, indefinite
commitment without treatment could constitute a violation of equal
protection. An involuntary commitment could be tantamount to a life
sentence, while a criminal conviction could result in only a short sen-
tence with early parole. 68
Recently adopted legislative schemes have indicated increasing
awareness of the need to provide adequate treatment. The underlying
purpose of California's statute, adopted in 1969, was to insure that:
"A citizen of California, the victim of sickness of the mind or spirit,
shall, without stigma or loss of liberty, receive prompt assistance to
match his need."'16' The new Washington Act takes tremendous
strides towards implementing the right to treatment. Section 41(2) of
the Act dictates that: "Each person involuntarily detained, certified, or
committed pursuant to this chapter shall have the right to adequate
care and individualized treatment."'170 Various sections repeat the
166. 325 F. Supp. at 784, quoting Ragsdale v. Overholser. 281 F.2d 943. 950
(D.C. Cir. 1960).
167. 406 U.S. 715. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
168. Several other theories support a constitutional right to treatment when the state
acts under the police power: (1) Involuntary commitment without treatment may consti-
tute confinement for mere status, which was prohibited by Robinson v. California,
note 54 supra, under the eighth and 14th amendments; (2) Commitment without
treatment might violate the "least restrictive alternative" requirement by tending to
prolong incarceration; (3) Viewed from a policy standpoint, the best interests of both
society and the individual mandate treatment. Society benefits from the return of a
productive unit and relief from the financial burden; the benefit to the individual is
obvious.
169. SUBCOMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE As-
SEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS. THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COM-
MITMENTS IN CALIFORNIA (1965), quoted in Comment, California's New Mental Com-
initnent Legislation: Is it Legally Sufficient? 6 CALIF. W. L. REV. 146, 147 (1969).
170. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.360(2).
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requirement. 7 1 Furthermore, the statute is firmly couched in terms of
the patient's best interests, rather than the availability of facilities.
This statutory directive appears to meet and surpass present case law
requirements.
IV. CONCLUSION
A definitive analysis of the constitutionality of any involuntary
commitment statute is presently impossible because of the lack of a
recent Supreme Court decision in the area. Ideally, a high court deci-
sion would focus on the three specific issues outlined in this comment
and would: (1) define the substantive limitations on state action, (2)
set out the procedural due process protections guaranteed to the indi-
vidual and (3) determine whether there is a constitutional right to
treatment.
Each of these issues speaks to an independent legal right. Substan-
tive due process installs the parameters within which the state can le-
gitimately act. Procedural due process seeks to guard an individual's
fundamental right to liberty by assuring that he is an appropriate sub-
ject for state action. A constitutional right to treatment either forces
the state to fulfill its obligation as parens patriae or, if acting under its
police power, to provide the individual with the catalyst to recovery
and freedom.
Washington's new involuntary commitment Act reflects both the
letter and spirit of the recent judicial decisions in the involuntary
commitment area. The Act takes giant strides towards restructuring
the legal status of mentally abnormal individuals. While a few
problem areas remain, such as the "gravely disabled" category and the
"clear, cogent, and convincing" burden of proof, the new Act puts
Washington State at the forefront of the "mental illness" reform move-
ment.
Ross E. Campbell*
171. Id.§§71.05.210, .310.
* Third-year law student, University of Washington; A.B.. 1970, Stanford University.
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